By- Ajita Singh, UG Law Student, Amity University Noida
ABSTRACT
The present study focuses on the constitutional lacuna that arises owing to the absence of timelines in Article 200 of the Constitution of India for Gubernatorial assent. In the modern-day era of 2025–2026, the age-old assumption of ‘Constituent Morality’ and the belief in benevolent leadership have been replaced by an effective Union veto. This research highlights how Governors, appointed by the Centre, have utilized their power of silence to bring State Legislative Assemblies to a standstill, moving India’s federal balance from ‘cooperative’ to ‘coercive.’ The paper argues that the Supreme Court’s shift from an activist position in May 2025 to the ‘dialogic’ Advisory Opinion of November 2025 has legitimized ‘Gubernatorial Indefiniteness.’ Based on comparative models from the UK, Canada, and the US, the study reveals that India stands as a constitutional outlier. The paper recommends amending Article 200 to incorporate a mandatory six-month period and adopting the ‘Doctrine of Deemed Assent’ to restore legislative finality.
Keywords: Article 200, Gubernatorial Indefiniteness, Union Veto, Federalism, Legislative Sovereignty, Deemed Assent.
I. INTRODUCTION
As far as India’s federal polity is concerned, the role of the Governor, constitutionally speaking, has seen a shift from being a ‘sagacious counselor’ to being a means of administrative excesses. The ambiguity surrounding Article 200 — owing to which there exists in India a state of ‘Gubernatorial Indefiniteness’ due to a lack of stipulated timeframe for the Governor’s assent — is the crux of the whole issue. The existence of a ‘Union Veto,’ whereby the central government through its nominees has succeeded in bringing about a deadlock in the state legislative process without assuming the liability of any denial, has been brought about by this constitutional void.
Under Article 200, a Governor is allowed to send back non-monetary bills for consideration ‘as soon as possible’ without setting forth an exact time limit for doing so. This loophole enables Governors to retain bills indefinitely, thereby creating a pocket veto whereby the constitutional will of the people is rendered null. In effect, without a deadline for action, the procedural delay becomes a ‘substantive veto’ of the elected body. The result of this ambiguous timeline is that unelected Governors become nothing but political representatives of the Central government — a procedural device becomes a political tool of ‘coercive federalism.’
The recent incidents from Tamil Nadu and Kerala have led to a reconsideration of the discretionary powers of the Governor. In Tamil Nadu, Governor R.N. Ravi held back assent on 12 bills — some since January 2020 — without justification. The significant State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu (May 2025) drastically restricted the Governor’s discretion, declaring that the Constitution does not give the Governor a ‘pocket veto’ and prescribed a timeframe of one to three months. However, the Supreme Court, in its Advisory Opinion on a Presidential Reference issued in November 2025, expressly repealed those safeguards, stating that the discretionary power of a Governor pursuant to Article 200 was non-justiciable and beyond judicial deadlines.
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